Representative Bureaucracy and Distributional Equity: Addressing the Hard Question by Meier, Kenneth J. et al.
REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY AND DISTRIBUTIONAL EQUITY:
ADDRESSING THE HARD QUESTION
Kenneth J. Meier, Texas A&M University
Robert D. Wrinkle, University of Texas Pan-American
J. L. Polinard, University of Texas-Pan American
All data and documentation to replicate this analysis are
available from the authors.  Address correspondence to: K.J.
Meier, Dept. of Political Science, Texas A&M University, College
Station, TX 77843, email kmeier@polisci.tamu.edu  
Representative Bureaucracy and Distributional Equity:
Addressing the Hard Question
Abstract
Research on representative bureaucracy has failed to deal
with whether or not representative bureaucracies produce minority
gains at the expense of nonminorities.  Using a pooled time series
analysis of 350 school districts over six years, this study
examines the relationship between representative bureaucracy and
organizational outputs for minorities and nonminorities.  Far from
finding that representative bureaucracy produces minority gains at
the expense of nonminorities, this study finds both minority and
nonminority students perform better in the presence of a
representative bureaucracy.  This finding suggests an alternative
hypothesis to guide research, that representative bureaucracies
are more effective than their nonrepresentative counterparts.
Representative Bureaucracy and Distributional Equity:
Addressing the Hard Question
Despite initial skepticism that a bureaucracy widely
representative of the people would make policy decision more
responsive to the public (Meier and Nigro 1976), recent studies
for both blacks and Latinos have found that under certain
conditions passive racial and ethnic representation can produce
active representation, that is policies that benefit minorities
(Meier and Stewart 1991; Hindera 1993a; 1993b; Meier 1993; Seldon,
Brudney and Kellough 1998).  Such findings in widely differing
bureaucracies from urban school districts to EEOC regional offices
to Farmer's Home Administration loan programs generate some
optimism simply because public bureaucracies are slowly becoming
more representative in terms of race and ethnicity.  At the same
time, policy outcomes are often perceived as a zero-sum game, the
gains of one group must be compensated for with losses from
another. 1  The fervor of the current affirmative action debate,
for example, reflects the sincere beliefs by some whites that such
policies take opportunities away from individuals simply because
they are white (Eastland 1996).  This study seeks to move the
literature on representative bureaucracy to a direct consideration
of such redistributional consequences. Given the inter-racial and
inter-ethnic distributional concerns, empirical work on this
question is desperately needed.
2First, a brief review of representative bureaucracy theory is
presented.  The theory has evolved from a rather simple view of
bureaucratic motivation to a fairly involved description of how
individuals' values affect decisions in complex organizations. 
Second, we present a model based on this review and operationalize
it using data from school districts in Texas.  Because our concern
is redistributional consequences, we estimate the impact of
representative bureaucracy on both minority and Anglo students. 
These equity concerns are best illustrated through traditional
regression analysis and a relatively recent analytical technique,
substantively weighted least squares (SWLS).  Third, using the
results of this model, we suggest an alternative specification of
how representative bureaucracies might influence public policy and
a new hypothesis about representative bureaucracies.
The Theory of Representative Bureaucracy
Until ten years ago, the theory of representative bureaucracy
was relatively simple. 2  In every organization individuals who
make decisions exercise discretion because organization rules
cannot cover every contingency and because organizational
socialization is rarely total (Downs 1967; Thompson 1967).  If
individuals are assumed to be utility maximizers, then individual
bureaucrats with discretion are likely to use that discretion to
make decisions that reflect their own values.  One source of these
values is the socialization process, and one of the most enduring
3relationships is the impact on race and ethnicity on values
(Carmines and Stimson 1989).  Representative bureaucracy, thus,
suggests that if a bureaucracy is broadly representative of the
public it serves, then it is more likely to make decisions that
benefit that public (Thieleman and Stewart 1996).  
The initial work examining a variety of value sources has
been replaced by work focusing on values related to race.  Not all
policy decisions are likely candidates for influence by a
representative bureaucracy.  Bureaucrats must have discretion over
decisions that are directly linked to race or ethnicity.  Meier
(1993) contends that representation is also enhanced by political
support and that, in some cases, a critical mass is necessary. 
Seldon et al. (1998) introduce the concept of a representative
role that mediates between one's background and one's policy
decisions.  
Quite clearly the work of Seldon et al. (1998), Hindera
(1993a;1993b), Meier (1993) and Meier and Stewart (1991)
demonstrate that minority access to positions in the bureaucracy
influences policies in such a way as to benefit minority
clientele.  What they do not address are the distributional
consequences.  Are the results of representative bureaucracy
achieved by taking benefits from some other group of clientele? 
Or might it be the case that representative bureaucracies are also
more effective and thus minority gains are not at the expense of
nonminority clientele? 
4An Operational Model of Representative Bureaucracy
Educational institutions are ideal organizations to examine
questions of representative bureaucracy.  School systems are the
nation's largest public employer; the modal bureaucrat is more
likely to grade papers in Des Moines than shuffle them in
Washington.  Schools employ numerous professionals who are only
loosely supervised; and, thus, discretion permeates the
organization.  School systems also generate a great deal of data
so that the redistributional results of a representative
bureaucracy can be assessed.
Our model of representative bureaucracy sets up what is
called an education production function whereby student
performance is a function of inputs to the organization and
various policies.  To this production function, we add measures of
representative bureaucracy to determine if it matters given
controls for other factors that affect performance.  Because our
concern is redistributional consequences, we run these models for
both minority students and Anglo students.
Our units of analysis are 350 Texas school districts with at
least 1000 students.  To make sure that the districts are
performing relatively similar functions, we further limit the
analysis to districts with more than 10 percent but no more than
90 percent Anglo students, that is, multiracial districts.  Data
are available for six years from 1991 through 1996 so we pool
5these data resulting in a total of 2097 usable cases with no
missing data.  Pooled models are frequently affected by problems
of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity.  To control for
serial correlation, a set of five dummy variables representing
individual years is included in the model. 3  Heteroscedasticity
was assessed using the White test; corrections for the modest
heteroscedasticity found did not alter the findings so the
ordinary least squares results will be presented.
Dependent Variable: Student Performance
The state of Texas requires students in grades 3, 5, 8, and
10 to take standardized tests every year.  The percentage of
students who pass these tests in each school district is the
dependent variable.  Our measures include pass rates for all
students, pass rates for minority students (blacks and Latinos),
and pass rates for Anglos.
Independent Variables: Controls
To ensure that any relationships found between representation
and student test scores are not spurious, a variety of other
factors that influence education performance are included in the
model.  Because our interest is in testing aspects of the theory
of representative bureaucracy, our discussion of these variables
is brief.  All are culled from the education literature and are
frequently used in education production functions. Production
functions typically include measures of environmental constraints,
6resources applied to the process, and district policies designed
to improve performance. 4  
In the context of educational policy, poverty is a serious
constraint on student performance.  Poverty not only means
students lack access to learning tools in the home (computers,
educational toys, etc.) but is also correlated with a less stable
and less supportive home environment (e.g., single parent
households, high rates of teen pregnancy, and low educational
expectations; Necochea and Cune 1996; Fuller et. al. 1996).  Our
measure of poverty is the percent of students who qualify for free
or reduced-price meals in the school lunch program. 5  The
relationship to performance should be negative.
The relationship between expenditures and educational
outcomes is one of the most contested relationships in educational
policy.  Examining a wealth of studies, Hanushek (1986; 1989;
1996) contends that there is no consistent relationship between
money and student outcomes.  Although this finding has been
challenged by others (Hedges and Greenwald 1996), it remains the
conventional wisdom.  In recent longitudinal studies, however,
Murray (1995), Evans, Murray and Schwab (1997), and Murray, Evans
and Schwab (1995) found that districts that increased expenditures
had improved performance afterward.
Three "expenditure" variables are included in the analysis--
per pupil expenditures for instruction, average teacher salary,
and percentage of money from state funds.  Per pupil expenditures
7for instruction are used in preference to total per pupil spending
because many Texas districts spend lavishly on extracurricular
activities.  Our concern is academic performance, so the spending
measure should be based on classroom instruction.  Education is
personnel intensive, and most spending pays salaries of teachers
and other staff.  Higher salaries are perceived in economic theory
as a way to attract better qualified persons to a profession
(Hanushek and Pace 1995).  Finally, state aid can be used to
compensate for inequities in local tax bases.  Although Texas is
not known for redistributive educational policies and has a long
history in court on this issue ( San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriquez , 1973; Edgewood Independent School District
v. Kirby , 1987; See also Texas Research League 1986; Accountable
Cost Advisory Committee 1986; Weiher 1988), greater funds from
state governments can compensate for a meager local tax base.  All
relationships should be positive.
Education policies are adopted to influence student
performance.  Two such policies deal with the learning
environment--class size and gifted classes.  Although many studies
indicate that only major changes in class size are effective,
schools with smaller class sizes should have an advantage at the
margin (see Pate-Bain et al. 1992; Nye et al. 1992; Hedges and
Greenwald 1996; Hanushek 1996, 54).  The measure is the number of
students per teacher in the district.  Gifted classes are
8generally conceded to be the best education that a school system
offers (See DeHaan 1963).  The number of students enrolled in
gifted classes varies greatly across these districts (0 to 31%),
and greater access should result in better performance.  Gifted
classes should be positively related to performance, and class
size should be negatively related. 
Teachers are a crucial element in a student's educational
environment.  As a profession based on life-long learning, there
should be some advantage to teachers with adequate experience,
especially in multiracial districts.  Our measure is the average
years of teacher experience which should be positively related to
student performance.  
One factor we cannot control for is the innate abilities of
the students, especially those abilities not correlated with
poverty.  A common strategy in such circumstances is to use exam
scores by the same cohort of students for earlier grades (see
Smith and Meier 1995).  Unfortunately, the state of Texas only
reported pass rates for individual grades for three of these years
and never reported grade level data by race.  While this suggests
the models are somewhat underspecified, the levels of explained
variation compare favorably to other models that do use a cohort
control (Chubb and Moe 1990; Smith and Meier 1995).
Independent Variables: Representation
Bureaucratic representation is measured at the street level
9(Lipsky 1980)--the percentage of black and Latino teachers. 
Although intra-minority redistributional consequences are
important in this area (Meier and Stewart 1991), in the interests
of parsimony we limit our analysis to minority versus majority
comparisons.  This emphasis makes the combined percentage of both
black and Latino teachers the appropriate measure.  Representative
bureaucracy hypothesizes that presence of minority teachers will
improve the performance of minority students. The education
literature suggests three ways minority teachers can do this: (1)
minority teachers are more effective at teaching minority students
(Moore and Johnson 1983, 472; Aaron and Powell 1982, 55); (2)
minority teachers serve as role models for minority students (Cole
1986, 332); and (3) minority teachers mitigate the negative
consequences of grouping, tracking, and discipline (Meier and
Stewart 1991).
If minority teachers improve the education performance of
minority students, then their impact on majority students should
also be assessed.  If minority teachers spend more time with
minority students or teach in a different manner, then Anglo
students could be worse off.  The redistributional concerns of
representative bureaucracy can be assessed directly by looking at
the impact of minority teachers on Anglo students.
Findings
Minority Representation and Distributional Equity 
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Table 1 presents the production function model for all
students, minority students, and Anglo students.  Although the
control variables are not our concern here, that they all are
generally in the predicted direction and significant is reassuring
in terms of model specification.  The only anomaly is for teacher
experience with positive coefficients for all students and Anglo
students and a negative correlation for minority students.
[Table 1 About Here]
The relationship of concern is the slope for minority
teachers.  In the all students regression, a one percentage point
increase in minority teachers is associated with a drop of .1113
points in the all student pass rate.  That relationship along with
the positive relationship for minority students--a one percentage
point increase in minority teachers is associated with a .0614
percentage point increase in minority student pass rates--implies
that there are redistributional tradeoffs, that minority students'
gains come at the expense of nonminority students.  Examining the
Anglo regression, however, challenges this conclusion.  A one
percentage point increase in minority teachers is associated with
a .0730 percentage point increase  in the Anglo pass rate.  This
finding is strong support for the lack of redistributional
consequences.  In fact, a representative bureaucracy appears to
benefit Anglos slightly more than it benefits minorities.
The puzzling finding for all students suggests that greater
attention needs to be focused on the composition of the all
11
student pass rates.  With 98.6 percent of students falling into
the categories of black, Latino or Anglo, the "other" students
cannot account for this finding.  Somewhat surprisingly, if one
regresses Anglo and minority pass rates on the overall pass rate,
one can account for only  77 percent of the variance (regression
not shown).  
The residuals from this regression, however, clarify the
situation.  Table 2 compares the districts with positive residuals
to those with negative residuals.  Clearly the difference between
these two sets of districts cannot be found in the superior
performance of any subset of students.  Although the positive
residual districts have a pass rate of 61 for all students
compared to 49.3 for the negative residuals, the pass rates for
Anglos and the pass rates for minorities are virtually identical
in both sets of districts.  What is different about the two sets
of districts is their racial composition.  The positive residuals
have 73.4 percent Anglo students compared to 33.4 for the negative
residual districts.  So while each group of students performs the
same, differences in the district's overall racial composition
distinguish between the two sets of districts.  The relationship
for all students, therefore, is a statistical artifact reflecting
the unequal racial distribution of students across these
districts.
[Table 2 About Here]
12
Representative Bureaucracy as Nonlinear
The residual pattern along with the fact that the positive
residual districts have far fewer minority teachers (6.3% versus
29.0%) suggests that the impact of representative bureaucracy
might be nonlinear.  Testing a hypothesis presented by Thompson
(1982), for example, Meier (1993) found a nonlinear relationship
between school administrators and student performance suggesting a
critical mass was needed to have an impact.
Table 3 presents the results of a nonlinear estimation of
representative bureaucracy (this table omits the coefficients for
the other variables).  These results support Thompson's argument. 
For all students, both the linear and squared minority teachers'
terms are statistically significant.  At low levels of minority
representation, the impact on students is negative; but at higher
levels it becomes positive.  Taking the first derivative of these
terms and setting them equal to zero predicts that the impact of
minority teachers on all students will become positive at
approximately 32.3% minority teachers, a somewhat higher critical
mass than Meier (1993) found in his nonlinear analysis. 
[Table 3 About Here]
The equation in table 3 for minority students shows the same
nonlinear pattern, negative at low levels and positive as a
critical mass is reached.  The threshold for a positive impact on
minority students is much lower than that for all students,
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approximately 21.8% minority teachers.  For Anglo students the
relationship is linear; including the squared term adds no
additional explanation to the equation.  These findings, along
with the lower levels of minority teachers in the "all students"
dominated set of districts, strongly implies that there are no
redistributional consequences of representative bureaucracy in
these organizations.  Anglo students actually do better in
bureaucracies that are more representative of minorities; so
minority student benefits do not come at the expense of
nonminority students.
The size of impacts for minority teachers are not large, but
then we should not expect them to be.  Environmental factors have
a dominant influence on school systems and student performance. 
Not every minority student is exposed to a minority teacher.  Not
all districts will exploit fully the talents of their teachers,
including minority teachers.  The difference in results for the
all student rates and the minority and Anglo pass rates suggests
that additional efforts to discriminate among these different
bureaucracies are needed.
A Substantively Weighted Analysis
 In a recent methodological development, Meier and Keiser
(1996) argue that relationships between variables can vary across
agencies.  This position implies that ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis will not provide all the vital information in a policy-
14
relevant situation.  Because OLS seeks to generalize to the
average case, it can miss those agencies that do better than
average or any other policy relevant sets of agencies.   
The basic process of substantively weighted analytical
techniques (SWAT) is that cases of interest are weighted more
heavily than cases of less interest.  One form of SWAT,
substantively weighted least squares (SWLS), starts with an OLS
regression and then designates a set of cases that are selectively
downweighted in a series of regressions until the cases of
interest are weighted as 1.0 and those not of interest are
weighted .05 (Meier and Keiser 1996).
Because our concern is tradeoffs, organizations that produce
more equitable results are those of interest.  To measure equity,
we divide the minority pass rate by that for Anglo students.  This
measure has a mean of .588 and a standard deviation of .117 (in
the average district the odds of a minority student passing the
exam are .588 the odds of an Anglo student).  Our interest is in
those districts that produce more equitable results so we select
the top ten percent of districts on this scale (those above .734). 
We then run a series of regressions weighting the equity districts
at 1.0 and decreasing the weight of the other districts in
increments of .05 until a final regression with weights of 1.0 and
.05.
Another way to address the equity question is to simply use a
dummy variable interaction between equity districts and the
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variable for minority teachers.  SWLS has two advantages over this
approach.  First, it does not induce the large amounts of
collinearity that an interaction does.  Second, SWLS permits all
slopes to vary, thus making the variable of interest compete
against all other variables for explanatory power.  The dummy
variable approach produced similar conclusions to SWLS for the
linear specification, but suffered from too much collinearity to
provide good nonlinear estimates. 6
The final SWLS and dummy variable regression results appear
in table 4.  The first column presents SWLS results for a linear
specification.  Comparing these coefficients with the findings in
table 1 provides information on what these equity districts do
different from what the nonequity districts do.  For the all
student pass rate the relationship remains negative but it ceases
to be statistically significant .  Equally important changes occur
in the representation coefficients for the minority and Anglo pass
rates.  The minority coefficient increases from .0614 to .0968,
approximately a 58 percent increase.  The Anglo coefficient jumps
dramatically from .073 to .187, an increase of 156 percent.  For
those districts more concerned with equity, these relationships
suggest that both minority and Anglo students benefit more than
their cohorts in districts not concerned with equity.  In such
districts, even at low levels of representation there are no
inter-racial redistributional consequences.  The comparable dummy
variable findings show similar results for minorities and Anglos
16
(columns 3 and 4).
[Table 4 About Here]
The second column of table 4 reports the SWLS nonlinear
specifications for the equity equation.  Again the relationship
for Anglos remains linear.  For the minority pass rate the
relationships are approximately the same as they are for OLS [See
Table 3] suggesting that if the linkage is nonlinear it is the
same in the equity districts as the other districts.  For the all
student pass rates, the coefficients are about half the size for
the Anglo districts.  While the nonlinear specification has slight
gains, they are rather modest so the conservative conclusion is
the relationship between minority representation and student
performance is linear for those districts highly concerned with
equity and that this relationship is much stronger than the
relationship for all districts. 
A visual depiction of the SWLS analysis for representative
bureaucracy--that is, minority teachers--is found in Figure 1. 
This figure shows how the slopes change at different weights, as
nonequity districts are downweighted.  The impact of minority
teachers on student pass rates changes dramatically for Anglo
students, rising approximately 2.5 times in the final weighted
regression.  The impact on minority student pass rates also
increases, although not as sharply, to almost 1.5 times the
beginning slope.  The change in the impact of minority teachers
for the all students pass rate falls to zero as the nonequity
17
districts are downweighted.  These findings, again, suggest that,
in districts with greater equity, minority teachers are associated
with increased student performance for both Anglo and minority
students .
[Figure 1 about here]
Conclusion
Representative bureaucracy is offered as a partial solution
for reconciling the conflict between democracy and administration. 
Given inter-racial and inter-ethnic political tensions, empirical
work on the redistributional consequences of representative
bureaucracy is badly needed.  This study of educational outcomes
provides traditional OLS analyses along with the use of SWLS in a
partial attempt to meet that need.  SWLS allows an investigation
into the differences between classes of cases based on performance
(Meier and Keiser 1996). In this study the performance measure
involves street-level bureaucrats (minority teachers) in equitable
and non-equitable districts. The findings of both the SWLS and the
OLS suggest that moving toward a more representative bureaucracy
will not have outcomes detrimental to the established majority.
Instead of minority students' gains coming at the expense of Anglo
students, both groups benefit from higher levels of minority
representation of street level bureaucrats--teachers--in the
education system.  There appear to be no redistributional
consequences.
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This paper is the first study to explore redistributional
consequences of representative bureaucracy using SWLS.  It should
not be the last.  A virtual wealth of appropriate data sets are
now available for investigation using this technique.  The
opportunity to identify the impact of changes in the bureaucracy
in several settings and over time would determine whether
distributional changes come at a cost to established interests.
School districts, similar to all organizations, vary widely
in how they take resources [inputs] and translate them into
educated students [outputs].  On a substantive level, this study
has established that equity districts translate inputs,
particularly minority teachers, into outputs different from how
nonequity districts do. The result is two specific findings. 
First, these representative bureaucracies do not  benefit one group
of students at the expense of another.  Second, organizations vary
so that even if future work does find redistributional
consequences in standard OLS analysis, that analysis must be
extended in a SWAT framework to determine if all  bureaucracies
produce the same patterns.
The lack of redistributional consequences which results
because all groups of students are better off suggests a
provocative new hypothesis for organizational studies:
Representative bureaucracies are more effective at meeting their
goals than nonrepresentative bureaucracies in similar
circumstances .  The underlying logic of this hypothesis rests on
19
the notion that discriminatory personnel policies result in less
able employees which, in turn, detrimentally affect agency
performance.  Representative bureaucracies do not erect such
artificial barriers to organizational performance and thus will
perform at a higher level than those with discriminatory hiring
practices.  The provocative nature of this hypothesis suggests
that representative bureaucracies are to be preferred on both
normative and empirical grounds.  While this is clearly only a
single study addressing one policy area, the findings and this
logic suggest that the linkage between representative bureaucracy
and performance has sufficient support to make it a credible
hypothesis in future research.
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Table 1. Representative Bureaucracy: Its Distributional Aspects
________________________________________________________________________
______
________________________________________________________________________
______
Independent Variable      All Students   Minority Students    Anglo
Students
Minority Teachers           -.1113            .0614            .0730
                            (.0158)          (.0191)          (.0172)
Expenditures
  Instruction Funds K        .3564ns         3.2466           1.8146
                            (.7933)          (.9568)          (.8656)
  Teacher Salaries K         .7638           1.4008            .7008
                            (.1288)          (.1553)          (.1405)
  State Aid                  .0230            .0639           -.0032ns
                            (.0091)          (.0109)          (.0099)
Policy
  Gifted Classes             .2827            .1778            .2642
                            (.0473)          (.0570)          (.0516)
  Class Size                -.7563           -.4024           -.4868
                            (.1684)          (.2031)          (.1837)
Poverty                    
  Percent Low Income        -.4090           -.2584           -.1648
                            (.0140)          (.0169)          (.0153)
Teacher Experience           .3693           -.7589            .3633
                            (.1056)          (.1273)          (.1152)
R-Square                     .71              .54             .54
Standard Error              6.47             7.80            7.06
F                         383.78           190.13          190.57  
N                        2097             2097            2097
________________________________________________________________________
_
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All relationships significant at .05 except those marked ns.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Dummy variables for individual years are not reported.
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Table 2. Comparing the Positive Residual Districts with the Negative
Ones
________________________________________________________________________
___
________________________________________________________________________
___
Variable                Negative Residuals      Positive Residuals      
Pass Rates
  All Students                 49.3                    61.0
  Minority Students            39.5                    40.3
  Anglo Students               65.8                    67.3
Percent of Students
  Black                        13.6                    11.6
  Latino                       52.4                    13.6
  Anglo                        33.4                    73.4
________________________________________________________________________
_
Residuals from Regression of All Student Pass Rate on Minority and Anglo
Pass Rates
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Table 3. The Nonlinear Impact of Representative Bureaucracy:
Distributional Consequences
________________________________________________________________________
_____
________________________________________________________________________
_____
Independent Variable      All Students   Minority Students    Anglo
Students
Minority Teachers           -.5254           -.3578           -.0816*
                            (.0372)          (.0453)          (.0419)
Teachers Squared             .0081            .0082            .0030
                            (.0007)          (.0008)          (.0007)
Expenditures
  Instruction Funds K       1.1647ns         4.0646           2.1164
                            (.7694)          (.9377)          (.8656)
  Teacher Salaries K         .6993           1.3355            .6767
                            (.1245)          (.1518)          (.1401)
  State Aid                  .0163ns          .0572           -.0057ns
                            (.0088)          (.0107)          (.0099)
Policy
  Gifted Classes             .2516            .1464            .2526
                            (.0458)          (.0558)          (.0515)
  Class Size                -.6071           -.2513ns         -.4310
                            (.1631)          (.1988)          (.1836)
Poverty                    
  Percent Low Income        -.3836           -.2327           -.1554
                            (.0137)          (.0167)          (.0154)
Teacher Experience           .4087           -.7191            .3779
                            (.1021)          (.1244)          (.1148)
R-Square                     .73              .56             .55
Standard Error              6.25             7.62            7.03
30
F                         392.34           192.52          179.44  
N                        2097             2097            2097
________________________________________________________________________
___
* p = .051
All relationships significant at .05 except those marked ns.
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
Dummy variables for individual years are not reported.
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Table 4. Alternative Representation Coefficients
________________________________________________________________________
____
________________________________________________________________________
____
                          SWLS                  Dummy Variable
Interaction 
                     Linear    Non Linear       Equity        Nonequity  
 
All Students       -.0114 ns     -.2416         .2291           -.1400 
                   (.0181)       (.0480)       (.0156)          (.0362)
All Students2        ----         .0044
                                 (.0009)
Minority Students   .0968        -.3435         .6189            .0150
ns
                   (.0223)       (.0586)       (.0428)          (.0185)
Minority Students2   ----         .0085
                                 (.0011)
Anglo Students      .1870         .2028         .1265            .0686
                   (.0183)       (.0489)       (.0405)          (.0175)
Anglo Students2      ----        -.0003 ns
                                 (.0009)
________________________________________________________________________
____
SWLS Final Regression Estimates (Weights 1, .05)
All coefficients significant except those marked ns.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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1.  Politics is, after all, the determination of who gets what,
when, and how (Lasswell 1936).  Politics thus implies conflict and
redistribution.  Despite the economics notion that there are
Pareto optimal policy changes, the day-to-day conflict in the
policy process suggests otherwise.   
2.  Several individuals have sketched out this theory, perhaps the
first being Norton Long (1952).  A recent presentation is Seldon
et al. (1998).  
3.  Serial correlation was a significant problem.  After a large
drop in scores for these districts in 1992, they generally
followed an upward trend.  The use of dummy variables to correct
for such problems is the traditional strategy for shallow pools
such as this one (Stimson 1985).  
4.  This literature is far too large to cite comprehensively.  See
the extended bibliography in Burtless (1996).  
5.  Some of the other measures might also tap dimensions of socio-
economic status.  Expenditures, because they are in part
determined by the local tax base, are an example of an indirect
measure of economic well being.  
6.  The tolerances for minority teachers, minority teachers
squared and the two interaction terms were all below .15.  The
tolerance for minority teachers fell below .1.  
Notes
